Introduction
In the last decade of the 20th century 43 countries have been considered as countries emerging from violent conflicts. Most of them were affected by intra-state wars and civil wars, and most of these belong to the category of the poorest ("less developed countries" according to criteria of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). An extraordinary high percentage was located in the African continent. The international community pledged more than one hundred billion dollars in aid to war-torn societies (Forman, Patrick and Salomons 2000, p1) . These were designed to build up infrastructure, to persuade formerly warring parties to resolve conflict in a non-violent way and to contribute to economic development and participatory governance.
Experts and political actors have stated that international agencies often used too narrowminded a concept in the past, reducing their activities to technical reconstruction after the end of violent conflict. A broader conceptualisation is needed to support the difficult long-term process of transformation from war to peace. This chapter gives an overview of the variety of tasks required to make post-conflict recovery successful in the sense of preventing further conflict and some tensions and dilemmas are identified and discussed.
The second section deals with terms and concepts and points out general premises for post-conflict recovery activities in order to contribute to the transition from war to peace. In the third section structural preconditions for successful regeneration and sustainable peace are discussed. This includes co-ordination among the multiple approaches and strategies of actors engaged in the field. The fourth section highlights the importance of programs for (re-)integration of refugees, displaced persons and former combatants and is illustrated by examples mainly from experiences in BosniaHerzegovina (BiH). The fifth section discusses elements of best practice design for external intervention that includes sensitivity to the needs of the local population, the potential of women and the nature of gender roles in specific cultural contexts. The final section stresses dilemmas and open questions.
Terms and Concepts
Many terms are used to describe key tasks of humanitarian assistance and development work after violent conflict: reconstruction, recovery, rehabilitation, resettlement, repatriation, reintegration and so on. In the late 1990s international agencies started to link these terms with the adjective ‚post-conflict' to emphasise that only after a sustainable truce could one move beyond relief towards some kind of normalisation on the one hand, and on the other hand to justify the return of refugees as early as possible. Following the definition of Forman and Salomons (2000, p2) postconflict is usually defined as (...) the period when hostilities have abated to the level where some Nevertheless the experience in some conflict zones shows that reconstruction is not necessarily regarded as a 'no go' term but might also be understood as a moral attempt to correct past wrong and injustices done to the victims of violence, as Norbert Ropers concludes in relation to current development and peace activities in Sri Lanka (see Box 2).
Box 2: View from Sri Lanka Re-construction' and the other ‚RRRs', in many crisis regions now called the ‚triple R' (sometimes combined with reconciliation) have been criticised because they imply that it is possible to go back to the pre-war situation. The main point being that it has often been exactly the socio-political system which existed then that had lead to the conflict in the first place. This is undoubtedly true for many conflict regions. But the argument overlooks that the ‚Re-' contains more than just a technical perspective, it also indicates a moral attempt to correct a wrong which was done to the victims of violence, destruction and expulsion. Giving up the perspective of re-construction might also be interpreted as giving up the right to re-turn, to re-settle and to re-build the homes and livelihoods for all those affected from the war. Because of this ethical dimension, it can be important to keep the term ‚post-conflict reconstruction'. This is at least the view taken in many areas of territorially protracted conflicts. Pugh proposes the term ‚regeneration' or ‚peaceful regeneration'. He argues that regeneration signifies a self-sustaining process, whereas rehabilitation tends to connote a power relationship, whereby so-called victims or offenders have things done to them because they are decapacitated or deprived. He defines peaceful regeneration a "process of social, political and economic adjustment to, and underpinning of, conditions of relative peace in which the participants, not least those who have been disempowered and impoverished by violence, can begin to prioritise future goals beyond their immediate survival". Moreover he supports the concept of ‚peacebuilding' which had been introduced by the peace researcher Johan and was revived by the former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Ghali. In his Agenda for Peace, he pointed out that post-conflict recovery involves far more than simply repairing physical damage and shattered infrastructures. He called for collective actions to "to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" and "to advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people" (Boutros Ghali 1992, p21) . Following Pugh (2002, p2) , peacebuilding thus can be defined as "activities intended to strengthen structures and processes with the aim of preventing a return to violent conflict". In this respect, peacebuilding and regeneration intersect with, and accompany, relief and development. This view has been widely accepted (see Matthies 2000, p105; Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999) . Even if very different points of view on the terms can be found among scholars and practitioners, there seems to exist a broad consent that a fundamental transformation of the war-torn society is needed. It is only by addressing the political, social, psychological and economic causes, as well as the effects of armed conflict that a recurrence of violence can be prevented and a viable peace established. This means that a variety of tasks has to be addressed and multidimensional approaches are needed.
Multidimensional Approaches
Many authors identify political renewal as the most important prerequisite in ensuring that the conflicts of interest that were partially responsible for the outbreak of war are resolved. To this end, it is necessary to create public and legal institutions that safeguard legal certainty and democratic participation (good governance), investigate human rights violations and reform and/or help to dismantle the apparatus of violence. If political structures are totally destroyed, they can and must be replaced by international organisations for a transitional period when necessary.
In addition to the physical construction of housing, infrastructure and health systems, social renewal primarily focuses on establishing civil society structures and promoting the social reintegration of former combatants as well as return of refugees and displaced persons. In this context, the importance of the psychosocial or psychological dimension is emphasised (Miall, Ramsbotham and Wood-house 1999, p203) , such as overcoming trauma and achieving reconciliation at individual and inter-group level as well as working on identity issues. The way in which the past is handled also plays a key role in this context. So that the victims of violence and expulsion can feel better in subjective terms, perpetrators must ultimately be brought to justice (see Gunnar Theissen's contribution to this volume).
In addition to infrastructure recovery (transport, communications, water and electricity) and agricultural rehabilitation, economic renewal must focus primarily on dismantling the war economy and "transforming the looting and pillaging economy into a peace economy" (Caritas 2000, p86) . Macroeconomic development and job creation are prerequisites, not only to safeguard the supply of essential goods and services but also for psychosocial stability. As a rule, however, post-war societies continue to be dominated by structures or legacies of war economies (for example, black markets and mafia structures) long after hostilities end. A vicious circle emerges since these conditions can act as a genuine deterrent to serious investors. Many post-conflict regions, such as the Balkans or the Caucasus, face an additional problem: as well as the effects of war, the consequences of mismanagement under a socialist planned economy must also be addressed. A key objective of post-conflict recovery is therefore to dismantle not only the war economy but also "the legacy of industrial monocultures and centralised planning bureaucracy, as well as the lack of business know-how" (Caritas 2000, p87) .
Another important question is how recovery initiatives can be designed in a way that contributes to overcoming cultures of violence. Even if formerly warring parties have signed a peace agreement, the issues of power, interest or identity, which spawn civil violence, do not disappear. In practice, violence may persist at lower levels within the society, continue unabated in certain regions, or flare sporadically. During prolonged violent conflict, persisting war alliances often create structures with an interest in perpetuating these conditions (Ropers 2000) . They include sections of the armed forces and security services, arms dealers, owners of land, capital and political privileges and groups and individuals who are able to exploit the shattered structures in order to engage in illegal business (Berdal and Malone 2000) . Cultures of violence and hostility between communities emerge. The goal of external assistance therefore should be to design "assistance packages that provide incentives for the non-violent expression, management and resolution of conflicts, even while attending to the pressing needs of their civilian victims" (Forman, Patrick and Salomons 2000, p14) . • Establishment of tradition of good governance including respect for democracy, human rights and development of civil society; • Healing of psychosocial wounds and long-term reconciliation; • Integration into co-operative and equitable regional and global structures; • Balancing of stable long-term macro-economic policies and economic management and locally sustainable community development.
Source: Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999, p203 Several scholars have pointed out that regeneration from violent conflict and gaining sustainable peace is a very long procedure and even more complicated and lengthy if the end of the war marks a period of nation-building and new risks (Perthes 2000, p452; Ferdowsi and Matthies , p322) . Based on case studies of different regeneration processes from five continents (Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Vietnam, Cambodia, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala), Ferdowsi and Matthies (2003) come to the conclusion that all these processes have something in common.
In most of these examples subordination of the military under the civil power and constitutional elements of democracy have been guaranteed, but the central questions of social justice remain unsolved. Obviously the question of overcoming social gaps has not been dealt with as an important issue in the process of designing and negotiating peace accords. Instead other problems were the immediate focus. Moreover the implementation of reforms such as improvement of the rule of the law and initiatives for constructive dealing with the past have not so far developed. In none of the cases was a functioning jurisdiction established which could control state administration and guarantee real division of power.
Despite these findings, four cases, the Lebanon, Somaliland, Bougainville and Mozambique are considered as examples of (relative) success. The development in the other cases investigated was either considered as failure, as in Somalia, Angola, Palestine and the Solomon Islands, or at least as highly problematic.
Based on lessons from these cases, Ferdowsi and Matthies (ibid.) summarise general premises for positive outcomes of recovery and peacebuilding processes:
• The principle of ‚inclusivity' of all relevant stakeholders, especially of competing elites; • The solution of the security dilemma (reducing and reforming the armed forces and police, guaranteeing their political control and establishing state monopoly of force and public security); • Reconstruction or renewal of the political system and administration, establishment of a legitimised government and power sharing models; • Mutual trust-building, capacity for dialogue and agreements and readiness for peace of the former warring parties; • Extension of the ‚top down' process to all levels of state and society in order to link it with a 'bottom up; strategy -support of civil society is an important prerequisite for fostering the peace process in the population; • Creation of a social and economic basis for the peace process by reintegration of those who suffered from the war, guaranteeing access to nutrition, health and education, trust building in local community networks and transformation of war economies to peace economies by investments in the human capital of the war-torn society; • Respect for the principles, norms and institutions that are linked with the history and culture of the war-torn society if they are useful for consent. Efforts of external actors should take into account these principles. Moreover they have to be ready for long-term engagement, which should also aim to support structural changes.
Structural Preconditions for Successful

Regeneration and Peacebuilding
Several elements and needs must be addressed very early in societies emerging from violent conflict in order to prepare the ground for sustainable peace and economic development. These include: 1. repatriation and resettlement; 2. public safety; . infrastructure recovery; 4. food security and agricultural rehabilitation; 5. health, education and social welfare needs; 6. governance and civil society and 7. macroeconomic stabilisation.
These activities can be applied in different phases of conflict. This is illustrated by a matrix, distinguishing four stages: crisis, post-crisis (before settlement), post-settlement and longerterm reconstruction (see figure 1) .
According to this matrix most of the activities start in a post-crisis scenario, but human rights monitoring, distribution of food and water and essential health services for instance can take place already during a phase characterised as "hot" conflict. Some activities can be started before settlement (transport assistance for return, shelter, psychosocial counselling, family tracing, mine clearance and aware-ness, conflict resolution training, recovery of transport system, power generation, waste disposal, telecommunications, seeds and tools distribution, veterinary projects, medical facilities rehabilitation, employ-ment and skills training). For all the other activities a settlement is needed. Some of them are considered as longer-term projects such as the reform of the civil service, administration and judicial system, the monitoring of these sectors, and initiatives for the restoration of financial institutions. This requires a set of tasks for short-term activities to cover human needs (relief), but also initiatives for long-term social, economic and political renewal (development).
The transition period is complicated by a set of socio-economic, political and psychological challenges within an uncertain security environment. Current responses to these challenges are considered inadequate because of the different approaches, institutional arrangements and funding systems of different actors. A report published by the World Bank (Coletta and Cullen 2000, p120) points out:
Humanitarian assistance is often unsustainable, and donors often lack interest in the transition period. The arbitrary compartments of humanitarian activities and development do not transfer well to real-world societies, where the fragility of peace and the persistence of violence make it difficult to draw distinctions between the ‚conflict' and ‚postconflict' periods. Humanitarian operations focus on quick response and short-term planning, while development agencies are often slow and inflexible. Both tend to focus too much on mandates rather on the needs of those affected by war and neither seems to rely on the knowledge and expertise of the other that may help improve operations. To address this gap, multilateral and bilateral institutions must become more coherent in their strategies and operations.
In the field of post-conflict recovery a variety of actors is engaged (see ‚Useful links' in the reading list). The question remains how the strategies of different agencies can be linked and co-ordinated in order to fulfil these tasks.
Integration of Relief and Development as a Political Project
Until the early 1990s development and relief largely operated in separate conceptual and institutional fields. At most, there were attempts to link them in a chronological process, i.e. a relief -reconstruction -development continuum. According to this model, development ceases during conflict escalation and is replaced by relief and -once ceasefires are agreed -rehabilitation, before being resumed in the final phase. These activities are undertaken by different relief agencies, or by separate sectors within the individual organi-sations, during a conflict. A problem of these functional distinctions is that many international organisations operate independently in the conflict region during the relief and rehabilitation phases, whereas development focuses more strongly on partnership (Caritas 2000, p82) .
In line with his comments on the requirements for peace consolidation, UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros pointed out in his Agenda for Development that different development strategies are needed in post-crisis settings than in peacetime. These strategies, he argued, must be put in place before the end of hostilities, in the sense of "post conflict preparedness". Furthermore, relief and development should not be viewed as alternatives. The findings of the case studies undertaken by the Center for International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University point in a similar direction and illustrate that there is no simple 'continuum' linking relief, recovery and development aid -rather these spheres of activity overlap temporarily and spatially in crisis environments (Forman, Patrick and Salomons 2000, p23) .
A number of international relief agencies and development organisations have come round to this view. They challenge the conceptual, chronological and sectorally defined functional distinctions between these fields and have concluded that in all phases of violent civil conflict, a multi-sectoral approach is essential. Throughout the 1990s, the continuum model was therefore steadily expanded to encompass the ‚contiguum' approach: The chronological stages and separation of relief and development were abandoned in favour of a model in which the two elements are co-ordinated and integrated. Relief work is thus embedded from the outset in a long-term, development-oriented, holistic approach that remains in place throughout the conflict (see OECD/DAC 1998, p48).
Some development agencies have adopted this approach. At the end of the 1990s, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), for instance, elaborated the concept of ‚development-oriented relief' which aims to support -through relief and rehabilitation -the establishment of social structures at local level and facilitate the transition from crisis to long-term development (GTZ 1998) .
The World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recently initiated a joint program in order to address the discontinuity between short-term humanitarian assistance and longer-term development and peacebuilding inter-ventions. Figure 2 illustrates possible synergy and partnership between humanitarian and development agencies and shows that bonding social capital and related humanitarian assistance tends to address the legacy of conflict (problems like displacement, famine, disease and death), while social and economic development that supports bridging social capital addresses the underlying causes of conflict (inequity, exclusion, and indignity). According to this concept, a key task for humanitarian and development agencies is to build bridging and linking (horizontal and vertical) social capital within communities and between the state and civil society when providing relief and rehabilitation.
Meanwhile, a number of relief organisations have come to regard peacebuilding as a joint relief and development task and have begun to integrate conflict transformation and peacebuilding activities into their work. Caritas Suisse (2000, p79) has set up some 'Core Principles of a Development Strategy for Peace Consolidation' and notes that organisations and their local partners can become key agencies of multi-track diplomacy by integrating demo-cratisation, human rights monitoring, encounter projects and elements of peace education in their work or helping to establish peace alliances. Apart from working on structural causes of conflict, development programmes must be geared to process oriented measures for renewing social relations, fostering dialogue and building confidence. 
Coordinating Funding Procedures
Scholars from the CIC see an urgent need for an overarching framework to coordinate the efforts of multilateral organisations, bilateral actors, regional entities and NGOs (Forman, Patrick and Salomons 2000, p34) . Moreover they demand a reform of the funding system, based on the observation that only part of the billions of dollars which have been pledged by the international community in aid to three dozen countries during the 1990s has contributed to recovery from conflict. A significant proportion of the pledged resources has never materialised or done so very slowly.
In order to improve co-ordination the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network (CPR) was established at a meeting of post-conflict/transition and emergency units of multilateral and bilateral organisations, convened by the World Bank in Paris in April 1998. This informal platform brings together 29 organisations that intend to improve operational effectiveness in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction according to the DAC Guidelines.
Nevertheless, lack of co-ordination still seems to exist within the UN system, and budgetary, institutional and operational divisions limit cooperation between humanitarian and development actors in planning interventions, mobilising resources and implementing projects. Within many organisations relief and development activities are designed by different departments and funded through distinct budget lines. Moreover, as Forman, Patrick and Salomons (2000, p54) point out, within aid agencies incentive structures generally reward the ability to ‚move money' rather than virtuosity in designing assistance appropriately. Consequently, societies emerging from conflict may receive aid that is redundant, harmful or squandered -too much of the wrong type of aid.
That is why the CIC scholars argue that a ‚Strategic Post-Conflict Recovery Facility' (Forman, Patrick and Salomons 2000, p57) would be needed. They suggest a Trust Fund to ‚bridge the gap', which should be seen as a mechanism to jump-start and synchronise the international community's response. It is to be used on a time-limited basis in each case, while a longer-term country plan is developed, dedicated country trust funds are established (possibly as sub-trust funds) and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies as well as NGOs become operational on the ground. The facility should be open for participation to the core organisations of the United Nations system (including the Bretton Woods institutions), to regional organisations, to governments who choose to contribute or pledge a set minimum and to NGO representatives. It would have dedicated funds available for its own analytical and preparatory tasks as well as a standing trust fund or a prenegotiated stand-by funding arrangement to jump-start recovery activities. The World Bank would serve as fiduciary agent for any trust fund arrangement, while the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) could provide administrative and substantive support to the facility's secretariat.
The Challenge of Integration
Careful conflict analysis is needed in order to co-ordinate the activities of multiple actors but also to create realistic objectives for intervention projects. As Forman, Patrick and Salomons (2000, p14) state, the ambitious recon-struction schemes which accompanied many peace accords ending internal conflicts during the 1990s have been "addressing multiple and sometimes conflicting political social and economic objectives". Lessons from failure and unsolved dilemmas can be drawn from experiences with repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Bosnia. One challenge is to meet the needs of the most vulnerable groups and to adapt programmes for reconstruction and regeneration according to the principles of social justice. At the same time it © Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management is necessary to identify groups who could be multipliers for social change and transformation. The following sections illustrate these challenges with concrete examples, especially taken from experiences in the Balkans.
(Re-)integration of Refugees and Displaced People
The question of repatriation and reintegration of refugees and IDPs has become one of the most important items on the international humanitarian agenda, attracting the attention not only of relief, development and human rights organisations, but also senior political and military decision makers. Starting with initiatives taken by the leaders of the Central American countries in the late eighties who called for a regional approach to this problem, almost every major peace agreement concluded around the world, whether in Bosnia, Cambodia, Mozambique or Namibia, has included specific provisions relating to the return of displaced populations. UNHCR plays an important part in this field. NGOs like Peace Brigades International have also rich experience in processes of repatriation, accompanying and giving assistance to people who returned in their homeland under insecure preconditions, as for instance in Haiti, Guatemala and Colombia (Mahony 1999; Mahony and Eguren 2003) .
How can repatriation and reintegration contribute to the peacebuilding process in war-torn societies? This question has to be answered with reference to a number of interlocking issues: 1. There can be no hope of normalcy until the majority of displaced or expelled people are able to reintegrate themselves into their respective societies. Forced displacement or refugee movements are an aberration, symptomatic of a situation in which the state is unable to protect its citizens and in which different groups of citizens are unable to live in peace alongside each other. Because it represents a very tangible form of progress, the voluntary return of displaced people can have an important impact on public confidence in the peacebuilding process (UNHCR 1997, p9). 2. Repatriation plays an important part in validating the post-conflict political order. Providing refugees with the opportunity to go home and to express their political preference is inherent in the concept of a free, fair and democratic election. 3. The return and reintegration of an exiled population may be a precondition for peace in situations where refugees are politically and militarily active. The return of refugees and their separation from the military represented an important step in the transition from war to peace in Cambodia, Namibia, Nicaragua and Rwanda, for example. 4. The return of displaced populations can make an important contribution to the economic recovery of war-torn states, as a high percentage of displaced persons creates problems in the design of programmes for social services, agricultural systems and other basic programmes. There are also examples, including from the Horn of Africa, and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (UNHCR 1997), where former refugees and IDPs contribute to peace building processes after return by revitalising the local economy. Even if returnees do not bring a great deal of financial capital with them in many cases, they possess a considerable amount of human and social capital.
On the other hand, a large and sudden influx of returnees can impose a substantial burden on the area where they settle. This is the case when people are forced to go back by the country of asylum without having the chance to prepare for return and reintegration.
It has become apparent in the post-war regions, for instance in the Balkans, that various lines of conflict can overlap and reinforce each other: in addition to the conflicts between different religious or ethnic groups, the urban-rural conflict and its associated cultural differences often overlap with conflicts arising from the unequal distribution of resources. The return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons in post-conflict regions may contain substantial conflict potential and result in renewed outbreaks of violence. This applies especially if they compete with local people for scarce housing and jobs, or if property claims remain unsolved. In particular the traditional urban/rural conflict gained additional importance through migration processes forced by the wars of the 1990s when great parts of the rural population settled in the cities and most of them remained for years, many until the present day.
Return of displaced people gained much attention in Bosnia, where 2 million out of a population of 4.4 million became refugees or IDPs. Nevertheless the process of return was marked by a series of failures. In particular, following the Dayton Agreement there were various problems raised by programs designed to motivate the return of members of minority communities or ‚minority return'. Previously, the international priority was to press ahead with minority returns because the situation created by war -that is, expulsion and the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ‚ethnically pure' territories -was unacceptable. Finally it proved to be impossible to motivate people to (re-)settle in regions and to a context were they were part of the ethnic minority. The experience showed that only elder people where ready to do so; younger and middle age persons stayed where they had migrated or went for different options. Years later, as a result of the obvious failure of the ‚Year of Return' in 1998, the UN, the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina (HR) and the EU started to review their political objectives for refugee return. The ‚right to return' continues to be upheld, but the approach that is now followed is to provide legal and financial support for all persons wishing to return to their regions of origin while recognising their freedom of choice. UNHCR therefore decided to continue to support minority returns but also considered other solutions that facilitate integration in a new place of residence. This is a recognition of the fact that many refugees have put down roots in their new place of residence and have no wish to return to hostile territory. According to the former High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch, it is only gradually being recognised that the restoration of the old ‚ethnic map', the "multiethnic and multicultural society in Bosnia which diplomats and artists rave about", is proving impossible because, as is stated by the former HR, "foreigners in pursuit of lofty political objectives cannot expect displaced persons to return to places where they do not feel safe and where they feel they have no prospects for the future" (Petritsch 2001, p313) .
A further problem that was not taken into account when drafting the Dayton Agreement and implementing relief and return programmes is that war-related changes overlap with changes resulting from system transformation. For example, the process of urban-rural migration has speeded up tremendously due to the war, but might have happened anyway due to the economic processes associated with system transformation, for these migratory progresses are part of economic change (transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, etc.). In this respect, it is not only the overemphasis on minority returns but also the forced return of large groups of people to depopulated (and economically bankrupt) rural regions -even when these were their homes before the war -which seems genuinely anachronistic.
Clarifying property rights and return of property to those who lost it during the war is an essential precondition for successful peacebuilding. In order to avoid unsolved property issues after forced migration leading to ongoing conflict, models of settlements and compensations should be integral elements of refugee policy. In Bosnia for instance, the European Union established a property commission. Experience shows that it takes much too long in post settlement situations for compensation to take place.
Forced migration processes driven by war have a tremendous impact for the distribution of resources between the stakeholders and also for the ecological balance in the areas of settlement.
In this process there are winners and losers (Boschmann 2003, p37) , and it would be too easy to assume that refugees are the losers in general and others the winners. The reality of war-torn societies is much more complicated.
Of course, refugees loose what they possessed. Nevertheless in those regions where they settle the local population outside the refugee camps also might be affected in serious manner and injustice might occurr. While the refugees are provided with food and goods for free, the refugees in addition use local resources such as water or land. If there is no compensation it may be that refugees live in better conditions than the local population.
One of the lessons is that (re-)integration activities should not focus too much on one special target group (with respect to the distribution of goods and services, such as, for example, seed material, tools, housing or education). Restricting support rigidly to just one target group (only refugees or only ex-combatants, for instance) carries a danger of implicit discrimination or exclusion of other groups who do not belong to this target group but whose living conditions are no better.
In repatriation assistance and reintegration initiatives, however, care must be taken to avoid the perception that the needs of the returnee population are being served to the exclusion of the current residents For reintegration to succeed, recovery efforts must include the entire community, with due regard for the rights of all.
It is important to determine if the project will impact on a conflict situation and how. Moreover there is a challenge to find out how conflict management initiatives and peacebuilding can be incorporated. In immediate post-war regions, antipathy is often so strong that initiating dialogue forums without careful preparation is counterproductive and can unleash dynamics that are hard to control. However, initiatives that encourage people to engage in joint action can be a basis for the shared process of designing pluralistic society for the future and dealing with the past, as an example from Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates. The project aims at constructing a youth centre and youth cooperative in Eastern Bosnia. The German-Bosnian NGO Ipak (Nonetheless) was set up in response to an attack on Tuzla on 'Youth Day' during the Bosnian war in 1995 that killed 71 young people and injured hundreds more. Ipak maintains a well-attended youth centre in Simin Han near Tuzla since 1997. The new project, 'Youth building the Future', is targeted at improvement of conditions for youth and aims at integrating Bosniak returnees and youth from Serb villages by offering space for gathering, international exchange, leisure, professional training and income-generating initiatives. Here, the objective is to integrate development approaches with peacebuilding and conflict management within the framework of community work oriented to training and employment.
Young people from different ethnic groups in rural communities will be encouraged to participate in joint activities involving construction of the youth centre, training in the skills needed in the wood-working industry and agricultural production. The intention is to move beyond the provision of training and also engage young people in income-generating production; funds generated should then flow back into the project. This will be accompanied by programs of psychological support (drug prevention and trauma work) and community work, by international youth exchange programmes and by seminars in non-violent action and conflict management. Some youngsters will also be involved in constructing the youth centre by joining a co-operative. Others will be involved in organising the centre's activities. This idea was developed by young refugees/returnees due to the experience that international initiatives for reconstruction so far have mainly focused on the technical dimension of rebuilding houses and infrastructure but neglected the needs for community building.
In the first phase of the project the Ipak team focused on information within the local context, creating a network of young activists and involving parents, schools and especially teachers from different villages and ethnic backgrounds who support the project. One of the most exciting experiences of the project so far is that by implementing the project very slowly and carefully a network with special focus on youth, teachers and community workers could be created. The people engaged for these purposes have to put much emphasis on dialogue with representatives and local administration as local governments change frequently and political power structures in this region are still dominated by nationalist groups.
Underpinning peace and human rights work with income-generating initiatives involving young people is essential for several reasons. If young people generate revenue themselves, this improves their families' financial situation and enhances their self-esteem, as they thus gain a place in the community and a certain measure of respect. It may also improve opportunities for selforganisation; for example the youth centre or encounter activities can be co-financed with funds which the young people have generated themselves. This would help to reduce dependence on foreign donors and support the development of a viable local NGO sector, thus benefiting the emergent civil society.
Funding programmes for disadvantaged social groups are widely available in post-war regions, but very few initiatives are geared to supporting income-generating measures for young people. Micro-credit programmes are utilised to a disproportionate extent by young people, but do not focus specifically on their needs and are also of doubtful benefit. Micro-project funds that promote competition and individual initiative would be far more appropriate and should be introduced as a matter of urgency for this target group.
The ongoing brain-drain in particular demands initiatives to support youth in post-war regions: According to opinion polls, two thirds of young Bosnians say they would leave the country if they had any opportunity to do so and many of them do find ways to leave. And moreover there is the danger that youngsters otherwise get into illegal business or could be recruited by nationalist forces if they are left without viable prospects.
(Re-)integration of Former Combatants
Beneath refugee return, a special focus has been given to the reintegration of former combatants -men, women and child soldiers -as an important prerequisite for peace building in recent years (Boschmann 2003 , p40, Kingma 2001 , Steudtner 2001 . Demobilisation and reintegration have to be considered as closely linked elements of post-conflict activity, because it is feared that ex-soldiers who are not adequately integrated into society could become a recruiting ground for criminal organisations or get involved in the black market. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, several waves of demobilisation took place after the war and they have been supported by international agencies. It took five years until it was realised that demobilisation and reintegration programmes should be embedded in a general concept of security sector reform (Heinemann-Grüder and Pietz 2003, p4) . Major reintegration projects have been driven by the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). These were primarily designed to assist economic reintegration and consisted of several components. The World Bank's Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project (EDRP) for instance has set up mechanisms for labour market information, counselling and job finding services, education and retraining services and management assistance. Another World Bank programme, Pilot Emergency Labour Redeployment Project (PELRP) was focused on self-employment in agriculture and smallscale business, institutional education and on-the-job training. The IOM Transitional Assistance to Former Soldiers (TAFS) marketable skills.
An evaluation has been recently published by scholars from the Bonn International Center for Conversion, BICC (Heinemann-Grüder and Pietz 2003) . The main findings are that the earlier World Bank activities (EDRP) suffered from a lack of cooperation with the ministries of the two entities and with the employment institutes at the regional or local levels. Moreover BiH's extremely high unemployment rate raised major difficulties, and the low level of education and passivity also contributed to the fact that only a small percentage of ex-soldiers could be integrated. The second project (PELRP) provided important feedback on the current labour market and stimulated institutional reforms among the employment institutes. IOM's activities were successful in that it managed to instil interest and trust in its services within the community of demobilised soldiers. Moreover it was possible to contact and inform soldiers while they were still in barracks. Employment activities proved to be effective and sustainable, instead of subsidising short-term jobs. There was close cooperation with ministries. IOM also introduced obligatory civic education seminars for applicants. These seminars focus on issues such as democracy, human rights and civil society. The BICC evaluation suggests that this component and some other elements of IOM's project were highly successful and should be transferred to other projects: 1 stimulation of self-employment and self-reliance; 2. individualised, needs-based approach to counselling; 3. financial assistance and 4. support of business start-ups.
One important result of the study is that international support should aim at creating sustainable national structures that can provide employment for ex-soldiers. Programs that are merely aimed at strategies for economic reintegration and offering job opportunities are too narrow. The individual and psychological situation of each soldier has to be considered as well. The Bosnia case has shown that the overwhelming majority of demobilised soldiers were not prepared for their post-military life while still in service-either by skills training education or psychological assistance. In particular the authoritarian patterns of thinking and ethnically-closed mindsets of many exsoldiers should be recognised as well. Moreover many representatives of veterans' organisations stressed the vital importance of psychological assistance for war veterans, an aspect underrated in the major reintegration programs (Heinemann-Grüder and Pietz 2003, p31).
Good Practice Design: Strengthening Local Capacities, Addressing the Needs of Women and Gender-Sensitivity
Relief and development programmes which focus solely on providing for those affected by war and ignore the need for local ownership run the risk of creating long-term dependencies that undermine, rather than encourage, the process of building a lasting peace. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, a dependency syndrome can be observed, as the former High Representative (HR), Wolfgang Petritsch (2001, p257), has stated: "every dollar in aid has led some people to assume that the international community will pay for everything -for ever." According to his experience, statutory measures of the HR frequently provided politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina with "an excellent excuse …not to do their work properly" and misled large sections of the population to expect the international community to assume exclusive responsibility for improving living conditions in Bosnia. In the period 1995-2000 Bosnia received four times the amount of money Europe received after the Second World War per capita.
To summarise the situation, one can state that the "paternalistic state was replaced by paternalistic humanitarian aid" (Stubbs 2001, p4) . It seems that the dependency syndrome in Bosnia is caused partly by the scale of the international presence but also by dubious concepts of aid, as well as fundamental errors in the Dayton Agreement itself.
As Stubbs has illustrated, within the Constitution agreed under Dayton no supranational agency has social policy as its main focus in BiH and the efforts of the lead agencies have been much more oriented to merely technical frameworks of government, human rights, economic development, reconstruction and return. Thus social policies remains an underdeveloped theme. Relief interventions have tended to operate mainly through INGOs or local NGOs, often subcontracted to provide services. Local capacities and skills, established by Bosnian professionals in centres for social work before the war, have not been used. Thus, the welfare regime became "fragmented, and localised, residualised, category-based rather than needs-based, and depoli-ticised" (ibid., p5). The World Bank initiated several emergency funds to provide incomes in the poorest households but still this scheme lacked sustainability; it did not include any plans for how to continue the scheme once donations dried up (ibid., p11).
Despite the extraordinary attention which has been given to this post-war society by the donor community, in the view of most scholars the case of Bosnia is not considered as a positive example because the international aid had a couple of unintended side-effects (Schneckener 2003, p58 ): 1. The humanitarian aid industry replaced the public sector and was an obstacle for the development of a local labour market and economy. Qualified persons prefer working for international organisations or in the (artificially overblown) NGO sector and thus are not integrated into local labour structures. 2. It is estimated, that 1 billion dollars of international aid that has been spent for BosniaHerzegovina since the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995, have been misappropriated (which led to the establishment of an anti-corruption unit within the Office of the High Representative). 3. International finances stabilised local elites and power structures that are linked with corruption, the black market and organised crime. Those who already had benefited from the war, benefited again from the international engagement for peace. Development policy institutions and relief organisations have often criticised the fact that peacebuilding measures have generally failed to view gender equality as a key element of social justice. Women are undoubtedly one of the most disadvantaged groups in crisis regions. In postconflict regions in particular targeted employment and com-munity-oriented initiatives for women are therefore essential.
Margaret Vogt (2000, p85) , Head of the United Nations Department for Political Affairs, has claimed in particular that programmes for (re-)integration should be developed and implemented with close involvement by local communities in order to prevent gross injustice. Very often male combatants or commanders who have committed human rights violations remain at liberty and so it seems that they are actually being rewarded after the event through their eligibility for support programmes; in other words, their crimes have paid. This type of distortion must be avoided at all costs. Furthermore, the situation of female fighters should not be overlooked: in many regions in Africa, Asia and Latin America, women fight side by side with men in guerrilla wars, thus gaining in apparent equality. After the end of hostilities, however, they are forced back into their traditional and generally subordinate roles. The social reintegration of women combatants receives far less attention, especially from foreign donor organisations. This has also been noted with respect to reintegration programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Heinemann-Grüder and Pietz 2003, p19) . Therefore women's organisations have called for measures relating to disarmament, demobilisation of combatants and reconstruction to be developed not only at the macro level but more importantly also within the local communities in order to ensure women's participation.
A fundamental problem is that normally women are only involved peripherally in decisions concerning reconstruction at the end of hostilities and in general aid programmes do not address their specific needs. Often, women also have little opportunity to express their views; for example, they have no access to the media. It is clear from the international debate that programmes to support physical and social reconstruction must develop a methodology for women's empowerment. There is also a need to focus on domestic violence, which is becoming an increasingly prevalent feature of post-war situations. For many women, the end of the public conflict and violence does not herald an end to all violence. As male ex-combatants return home, their trauma and frustration is often projected onto their wives and families. So the rape and assault of women increases. Often women are the likely targets of looting, attack and 'economic violence' perpetrated by ex-combatants (Anderlini 2001, p37) .
Moreover in persistent war economies women are forced into oppression and prostitution or mafia-structures that gain from trafficking and enslavement of women. Reports on forced prostitution in Bosnia-Herzegovina have put this issue back on the agenda (Böhm 2000; Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights 2001; Ulrich 2001). Consequently international women's organisations argue that debates about security problems should involve women as well as men, in order "to include gender perspectives into existing security agendas" (Anderlini 2001, p37) .
The former United States ambassador, Swanee Hunt, founder of the initiative, Women Waging Peace, calls for a "concept of inclusive security", a "diverse, citizen-driven approach to global stability, which expands the array of tools available to police, military and diplomatic structures by adding collaboration with local efforts to achieve peace" (Hunt and Posa 2001) . This concept emphasises women's agency, not their vulnerability. Moreover there is a claim for involving women to a greater extent in peace negotiations to make sure that they can participate in decisions on the future of their communities. This was one important argument of the campaign Women Building Peace: From the Village Council to the Negotiation Table, set up by the NGO International Alert (see the contribution of Diana Francis in this volume).
The task of supporting women in their efforts to secure equal opportunities for political participation and a role as stakeholders in society undoubtedly derives from the need for democratisation, equal opportunities and participation -principles which are also important elements of sustainable peace agreements. However, this does not mean that a higher proportion of women in political processes would necessarily lead to more intensive efforts for conflict transformation. It is important not to assume that women have natural attributes that endow them with better peacemaking skills for these tasks and they are no more inherently peaceable than men. After all, women are involved in countless civil and international wars, either supporting the combatants or serving as combatants themselves; elsewhere, women -like men -are actively involved in the dis-semination of nationalist and xenophobic ideologies. Nevertheless it turns out that in some conflict zones women proved to be important partners for peace constituencies or disarmament and demobilisation campaigns. In Mali the Mouvement National Femmes pour la Sauvegarde de la Paix et de l'Unité Nationale was leading a civil society movement that urged regional governments to adopt a 3-year moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of small arms. In Guatemala and Liberia women were engaged in campaigns to disarm combatants, using their traditional roles and acceptance in society for broader mobilisation (Anderlini 2000, p20) .
External actors who intervene into conflict zones can address the potentials of women if they understand the social status and roles which women play in the society. In this context, attention has to be paid to the symbolic link between the dimensions of gender, power and culture (as has been highlighted by Diana Francis in this volume). A comparative case study that investigates the process of peace consolidation in the South Pacific (Böge 2002) argues that at least the inclusion of women's groups in grass roots activities and in the negotiation process (and also the inclusion of female peacekeepers who could function as connectors between internal and external efforts) has contributed to progress in Bougainville, because traditional forms of conflict management could be activated. In the Solomon Islands, on the contrary, the traditional role and significance of women (as owners of the land in a matrilineal society) was systematically neglected and the decision to send an exclusively male peacekeeping mission contributed to the failure of the peace process.
A real challenge for the organisations involved in post-conflict peacebuilding is therefore shaping peacebuilding approaches with special sensitivity for the situation of men and women in post war situations and their different realities and needs.
Female as well as male scholars and practitioners put emphasis on the special role of women as agents of change, which should be promoted in all reconstruction and economic development activities (Forman and Salomons 2000, p3) . A policy study carried out for the German GTZ recommended that a gender impact assessment should be carried out when planning development and technical cooperation projects; this would critically analyse social processes in the target country and analyse to what extent women could be supported in their productive roles. The study also argued that development cooperation must "help to maintain the advantages which women have secured for themselves during a crisis; in some crisis situations, women take over jobs which they were previously barred from", and should be supported in preserving these new roles and ensuring that there is no retrograde development (Mehler and Ribeaux 2000, p136 ; this aspect has also been highlighted by Reimann 1999 Reimann , 2001 Woroniuk 1999; Spearman 1999) .
Open Questions
War-torn societies vary enormously in their ability to manage and absorb foreign assistance. Recipients often lack the human, technical and administrative capacities required to make use of large quantities of aid or to co-ordinate the multiple donors and NGOs that arrive to assist their recovery. Experiences such as those in Bosnia (and there are already similar signs in Kosovo) show that an abundance of external assistance, if it cannot be absorbed by local capacities, or if local capacities are simply not used for sustainable systems build upon local ownership, may result in an expectation that physical and social reconstruction must largely be undertaken by external agencies forever. Therefore one of the key challenges is to combine structural measures with process-oriented initiatives and to co-ordinate short-and long-term measures in a meaningful way. This includes overcoming the deficits and problems that arise from the practice of the international community in organising aid and assistance: a lack of coherence, co-ordination and effectiveness and a lack of realism concerning aims and means. This implies changes in the international donor community as well as in the UN system.
The argument for a 'strategic post-conflict recovery facility' in order to improve coordination of agencies and activities sounds convincing. The proposal to create a 'World Peace Foundation' or 'World Peace Security Council', which has been developed by other scholars and practitioners recently (Ferdowsi 2002, p19) , points in the same direction. The question remains how to design such an agency in a way that it will be really effective and avoid additional bureaucracies that make things even more complicated and less transparent, especially for the recipients of aid.
If reconstruction and regeneration measures are to be effective, they must be based on the principle of justice. This means bringing perpetrators before the court and compensating victims for the material losses they have sustained. Measures for regeneration must be effective in offering all members of the community opportunities for participation and viable economic prospects. Peace education and training efforts are unlikely to be effective if the overall conditions for conflict transformation are not in place (in other words if the social imbalances are too pronounced, if there are massive conflicts between war profiteers and war losers, or if there are no economic chances for some social groups). Conversely, long-term development strategies which focus on economic and social reconstruction can only play an effective role in peacebuilding if they involve different social groups, such as returnees, local population and refugees, as well as ex-combatants -or at least none of these groups should be neglected. Programmes for the integration of refugees, IDPs and excombatants have to be developed both on the local and on the national level, in order to avoid injustice as well as to address potential alliance partners for peace processes. In this context, youth should be considered as a special and important target group for two reasons. Neglecting youth means that their destructive potential could be activated, as young men who lack prospects might easily be recruited by warlords or join criminal structures. Secondly, involving youth means developing innovative social capital for renewal of society. The potential of women as alliance partners for peacebuilding is also important. With regard to social justice and human rights, it is an urgent task to focus on women's legal and social equality, their participation in the political process and their self-confident involvement in civil society.
According to the principle of justice the most vulnerable groups in post-conflict societies should be the priority for support by international aid. But any strategy for reconstruction and regeneration which is designed for post conflict peacebuilding has to cope with the dilemma that the most vulnerable groups are not automatically those who endanger peace nor are they automatically connectors or multipliers for peace processes. Strategies thus have to find a careful balance with respect to the principle of justice and, for instance, the need for reintegration of former combatants in order to reduce the risk of new outbreaks of violence.
It is a sign of progress that the reality of women's lives in post-conflict situations is increasingly becoming a focus of interest. Nevertheless there is a trend that agencies often reduce the gender concept to the special role and potential of women, regarding women either as a vulnerable group or as special agents of change. However, in order to overcome cultures of violence it is equally important to examine the psychosocial effects of war and post-war reality on men and masculine identity in order to analyse appropriately the significance of gender relations in the causes and dynamics of violence. This means also taking their trauma and loss of self-esteem seriously. Ex-soldiers for instance, as victims and perpetrators, need psychological counselling in order to be prepared for civilian life. This has not yet been addressed sufficiently in demobilisation and reintegration programmes, as the Bosnian examples have shown. Moreover the gender perspective must go beyond simple patterns of victims and perpetrators and has to address the questions of the Forman, Patrick and Salomons (2000, p64/65) extent to which social constructs of masculinity and femininity contribute to the dynamics of violent conflicts and how to change these constructs and symbolisms so that cultures of violence can be dismantled. If conflict impact assessment is extended to this view, there is no need for complicating things by establishing additional 'gender impact assessment' mechanisms. In order to incorporate gender aspects to the range of instruments for conflict analysis and impact assessment, criteria in relation to the influence of identity patterns have to be developed, such as militarised masculinity. Identifying approaches that overcome these patterns is a key element for strategies that aim at overcoming cultures of violence. Approaches to conflict impact assessment must be developed further and applied within all the various agencies, i.e. IGO's and NGOs involved in relief, development, peace and human rights work. It proves difficult to apply "data-hungry models" in conflict-torn environments, where even baseline data may be lacking. Therefore benchmarks and indicators appropriate to war-torn settings are needed, taking into account the specific country context and situation. In this regard donors should shift their view and accept that earnest evaluations will be more likely if aid agencies adopt outcome-based program planning and hold management accountable less for the problems exposed than for the corrective actions taken in response to these appraisals (Forman, Patrick and Salomons 2000, p54). Agencies need to develop realistic benchmarks and criteria for success and to develop adequate methods of self-reflection and self-evaluation. But even if external actors choose best practice design and self-reflective procedures for interventions they still have to face some dilemmas which result from the international context: • Programmes of repatriation and reintegration of refugees and IDPs can play an important role in peacebuilding processes. But there is the dilemma that despite a well-established international principle that refugee repatriation should take place on a wholly voluntary basis and in conditions of safety and dignity, it is quite clear that a large proportion of the world's recent returnees have been repatriated under some form of duress, as has been admitted by many UNHCR reports in the past. Such duress has in many instances been deliberate, exercised by governments, host communities and other actors, with the specific intention of forcing refugees to go back to their homeland. Also the principle of non-refoulement, which prevents refugees from being returned to countries where their life or liberty would be at risk, has been flouted on a regular basis during the past few years (UNHCR 1997) . This practice certainly obstructs well designed (re-)integration strategies in the field.
• The claim for better co-ordination of efforts for regeneration and reconstruction is confronted with a general problem. It is obvious that recovery of war-torn societies is an element of a competing international 'charity business', but it is also influenced by the conflicting business interests of private firms (and national governments who strive to represent the demands of those companies) engaged in crisis regions, at least as far as material (re-)construction is concerned. This was particularly debated in public in a very drastic way after the end of the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003. Before the fighting was over, governments and companies in several countries started to secure advantages for big business in rebuilding highways, houses and infrastructure, and to participate in the competition for phone rates and transmission frequencies and opportunities for rebuilding the banking system -and in this special case also restructuring the oil-market. The question that was discussed in the international media was who will gain the big business in the Bagdad Basar and who will pay for it (Pinzler and Vannahme 2003) . The question of who will deliver what the Iraqi people really need was not so much discussed.
• It seems that UN-secretary Kofi Annan's (2001) proposal to establish a "culture of prevention of violent conflict" has been challenged at the beginning of the 21st century by doctrines such as unilateral preventive intervention (and aggression). An increasing tendency for military operations gained priority at least in the State Departments of some powerful Western nations, especially the United States. This tendency has been reinforced by the concept of "war against terrorism". Multilateral organisations such as the United Nations are not in a leading and decisionmaking role but more and more reduced to deal with the consequences of this policy: restoring and recovering of devastated societies, according to the slogan "US fights, EU funds, and UN feeds". Given this context, the following questions have to be raised: How does this international development affect third-party interventions for peacebuilding strategies? Can agencies that aim at conflict transformation and trust building work effectively in this scenario or will they loose their credibility? This dilemma had already been raised after the NATO-Intervention in Yugoslavia 1999. It is even more obvious in Afghanistan and Iraq.
